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oday’s ﬁnancial press reports regularly
on evidence of systemic risks, ﬁnancial
fragility, banking failures, stock market
collapses, and exchange rate attacks through-
out the global ﬁnancial network of the
1990s.  To a ﬁnancial historian, these
reports simply reprise similar concerns and
risks in numerous episodes of ﬁnancial
innovation and regime change in the past.
True, the 1990s have the peculiar feature of
emerging markets among newly indepen-
dent states that are trying to market either
their government debt or securities issued
by their former state enterprises.  But this
situation does not eliminate the relevance
of past episodes; it merely limits it to fewer
periods.  The period after World War I had
many of the same problems, for example,
although policymakers then subsumed
them largely under the issues of whether,
when, and how to return to the pre-war
gold standard that had created a much more
benign ﬁnancial system worldwide.  Policy-
makers of that time were much more inter-
ested than their modern counterparts in
exploring lessons from the past. 
For example, William Acworth’s classic
study, Financial Reconstruction in England,
1815-1822, was published in 1925.  He
argued convincingly that the severe deﬂa-
tionary policy followed by the government
and the Bank of England after peace in
1815 had prolonged and deepened unnec-
essarily the economic troubles accompany-
ing the transition from a wartime to a
peacetime economy.  Nevertheless, the
British government and the Bank of Eng-
land pursued much the same strategy after
World War I, again taking six years after the
peace treaty to resume convertibility—and
at the prewar standard.  Again, monetary
ease that followed resumption led to a
surge of prosperity, speculative ventures in
the capital markets, and eventual collapse
of the ﬁnancial system.  The difference was
that in 1825-26, there was a systemic stop-
page of the banking system, followed by
widespread bankruptcies and unemploy-
ment, while in 1931 there was abandon-
ment of the gold standard, followed by
imperial preference and worldwide move-
ments toward autarky.  So much for the
lessons of history!
As pessimistic as Acworth was in asses-
sing the consequences of Britain’s ﬁrst return
to the gold standard in 1821, the conse-
quences of the ensuing monetary expansion
and speculative boom that ended in the
spectacular collapse at the end of 1825
proved to be not so dire in the long run for
the British economy.  The policy changes
that affected the monetary regime—the
exchange rates, the structure of the bank-
ing sector, the role of the Bank of England
and the management of the government’s
debt—while minor in each particular and
slow to take effect, were cumulatively
effective in laying the basis for Britain’s
dominance in the world ﬁnancial system
until the outbreak of World War I.  This
outcome contrasts sufﬁciently with the
disappointing pattern of British economic
progress during the twentieth century after
both World War I and World War II that
perhaps we should take a fresh look at the
economic and ﬁnancial transition after the
Napoleonic Wars.  What caused the prob-
lems identiﬁed by Acworth that culmi-
nated in the stock market crash of 1825
and the English banking system’s failure to
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withstand its impact?  More important, why
did the British government’s relatively modest
reforms prove to be so effective in the long
run?  Perhaps we can glean more useful
lessons for today’s policymakers than pre-
vious historians have been able to provide.
The argument developed in this paper
is that the common element in all the
problems of Britain’s ﬁrst return to gold
arose from the pressures of coping with
vastly increased informational uncertain-
ties within the existing structure of Eng-
lish institutions.1 These problems started
with the Treasury itself, confronted by the
difﬁculties of servicing the huge govern-
ment debt accumulated during the Napole-
onic Wars and deprived of its primary
source of revenue, the income tax.  They
continued within the Bank of England,
forced now to take on new responsibilities
while searching for new sources of revenue
to replace its wartime proﬁts.  They were
compounded by the response of the Lon-
don capital market, which produced a
bewildering array of new ﬁnancial assets to
its customers to replace the high-yielding
government debt now being retired.  All
this left the London private banks and
their corresponding country banks—as
well as their customers in agriculture,
trade, and manufacturing—ﬂoundering in
the resulting confusion.  The government’s
piecemeal reforms, introduced during the
crisis of 1825 and its immediate aftermath,
provided smoother patterns of tax collec-
tions and interest disbursements, established
Bank of England branches throughout Eng-
land, stimulated country bank competition
with joint-stock companies outside of Lon-
don, and eliminated the Bubble Act of 1720.
Even the bankruptcy laws began to be rewrit-
ten in 1831.2
These disparate reforms made margi-
nal improvements in the efﬁciency of
information gathering and processing by
the government, the central bank, the
banking system, and the stock market
while preserving the separation of functions
among them.  Maintaining these “ﬁrewalls”
among the types of institutions making up
the ﬁnancial sector of the British economy
diminished the immediate impact of the
reforms, but it enabled them to become
increasingly effective over time.  True,
crises continued to arise throughout the
rest of the century as the British economy
was subjected to repeated shocks of wars,
famines, frauds, and foreign defaults.  But
the evolving ﬁnancial sector of the British
economy surmounted each crisis with
increasing conﬁdence, and all the while
these ﬁrewalls were preserved.  The ﬁrewalls
meant that relationships among ﬁnancial
intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets had to
be maintained by short-term contracts in a
competitive market environment rather than
by regulations imposed by centralized
authority with long-term rigidity. 
The focal point for these new market
relationships was the market for discounted
commercial bills that arose rapidly in impor-
tance after the crisis of 1825.3 Once again,
as in earlier crises and in those that were to
follow until World War I, the British ﬁnan-
cial sector was able to ﬁnd a market solution
to the problems created by its relatively inef-
ﬁcient and disparate ﬁnancial institutions.
In the longer run, the ﬂexibility of response
provided by the combination of markets and
ﬁnancial intermediaries coexisting in the
British ﬁnancial system enabled it to with-
stand exogenous shocks and to ﬁnance
expansion of the real economy.  To elucidate
and elaborate this argument, I analyze, in
turn, the shock to the ﬁnancial system of
shifting from wartime to peacetime ﬁnance
in 1821, the ﬁnancial crisis that occurred at
the end of 1825, the Bank of England’s
efforts to pick up the pieces, and, ﬁnally,
the rise of a market in discounted commer-
cial bills that put things right again—for
awhile.  The lessons of each episode high-
light the importance of appraising the
ﬁnancial system as a whole, rather than
focusing on what appears to be its weak-
est link.  In retrospect, it seems critical to
allow information to ﬂow freely among 
the various parts of the system in order
that markets may form to price and
intermediate risk.  At the time, the Bank 
of England refused to divulge important
information and remained aloof from
market activity until it was forced to act,
usually too late.  Only gradually wereFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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In the expansion of war ﬁnance that
the Napoleonic Wars induced in Britain, all
parts of the British ﬁnancial system pros-
pered.  At the top, the Treasury beneﬁted
from increased taxes, especially the income
tax, as well as the expanded market for its
debt, both long-term, funded debt and
short-term, unfunded debt.  The Bank of
England proﬁted throughout the Napole-
onic Wars as the government’s agent for
ﬁscal transfers both at home and abroad
throughout the most expensive war fought
in history to that time.  It increased its
annual dividend to 12 percent from 7 per-
cent in 1805 (reduced back to 10 percent
in 1807), greatly enlarged its staff, built
new facilities at its location on Thread-
needle Street, and expanded its note issue
as well as its advances to merchants and
manufacturers in London.4 The business
of the London private banks expanded at
the same time that foreign merchants ﬂee-
ing the extortions of Napoleon’s troops
brought their affairs to London.5 Country
banks multiplied in great number and
proﬁted by issuing small-denomination
banknotes to replace metal coinage in the
domestic circulation after the Bank of Eng-
land suspended convertibility in February
1797, and the restrictions against issuing
small-denomination notes were suspended
in March 1797.6 In short, the entire British
ﬁnancial sector enjoyed prosperity on the
basis of war ﬁnance.
True, the commercial crisis of 1810
brought the Bank of England’s prosperity—
and arrogance—under close scrutiny by its
enemies and led to the Bullion Report of
1810.  By undermining the intellectual
authority of the Bank’s directors, the Bul-
lion Report provided the courage needed
for subsequent governments to constrain
the Bank’s power and to overrule its rec-
ommendations on monetary matters if that
became politically popular.  The Bank’s
practical autonomy, however, remained
intact as the government still relied on it
for managing its remittances and, espe-
cially, its recurrent issues of debt—both
long-term, funded debt (perpetual annu-
ities comprised mainly of 3 percent consols)
and short-term, unfunded debt (one-year
Exchequer bills bearing daily interest).  The
Treasury at this point was the Bank’s strongest
defender against the criticisms of the Bullion-
ists, arguing that the needs of war ﬁnance
justiﬁed the fall in the exchange rate of the
paper pound.
As a result, for three years after the
signing of the peace treaty in Paris in
1815, the government acquiesced to the
Bank’s various arguments that resumption
of cash payments should be delayed—
whether until the exchanges had stabilized,
or the bond market had strengthened, or
foreign trade had picked up, or its gold
reserves were increased.  Finally, in 1819,
the government initiated a bill to force the
Bank to resume convertibility, after initial
experiments in 1817 at limited convertibil-
ity of Bank notes had succeeded without
any harmful consequences.  Even so, the
Bank managed to make the transition as
difﬁcult as possible, ﬁrst by amassing a
large stock of gold, which helped keep up
the price of gold in the markets, and then
by withdrawing the notes from circula-
tion that the government used to repay
£10,000,000 of Exchequer bills that had
been held by the Bank.  Further, it refused
to lower its rate of discount on bills and
notes even as its loan business to the pri-
vate sector declined.  The resulting price
deﬂation intensiﬁed both agricultural and
manufacturing distress but enabled the
Bank to resume full convertibility of notes
into coin in May 1821 and to skip almost
entirely the intermediate step of limiting
convertibility to ingots of 60 ounces, as
proposed by Ricardo.  While, at the time,
Ricardo criticized the Bank’s directors as
“indeed a very ignorant set,”7 it appears to
later historians that the Bank was respond-
ing angrily to the government’s efforts to
use the Bank to support its short-term debt
financing while taking away the Bank’s power
to control the level of its own liabilities.8FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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The elimination of the income tax in
1816 brought an end to the mutually agree-
able arrangements between the Treasury
and the Bank that had existed during the
war.  The fall in tax revenues meant a sharp
rise in the ratio of tax revenues that the gov-
ernment had to devote to servicing the huge
debt accumulated during the war.  Figures 1
and 2 show clearly the rise in government
debt during the war, the ease with which
the mounting debt was serviced while the
income tax existed, and then the constraint
upon the government’s peacetime budget
created by the continuing debt service.  In
the absence of an emerging revenue source,
it was a serious shock to the Treasury to
lose an income stream that had amounted
to nearly 20 percent of its total gross
income in 1816 (£14.6 million) and had
virtually vanished by 1818.9 This was the
shock that forced readjustment throughout
the entire British ﬁnancial system, from the
Treasury right down to the country banks.
The Treasury confronted this situation
with a variety of ploys.  One was to raise
the price of its long-term bonds in the
London Stock Exchange so that new debt
at lower interest rates could be issued in
order to reduce its expenditures on debt
service.  It preferred to reduce this form of
expenditure rather than cut back on tradi-
tional sinecures of the royal family and the
landed aristocracy or reduce further the
army and navy.  Expenditures had to be
cut not only because the repeal of the
income tax had reduced revenue, but also
because of the fear of further losses of rev-
enue that might follow from reductions in
various customs duties and excises.  Coun-
terarguments that both foreign trade and
domestic commerce would increase in
response to lower tax rates enough to gen-
erate the same revenues as before failed to
persuade a timorous government.  A few
experiments were tried, some of which
proved successful, but in the prevailing
disturbed monetary conditions, any reduc-
tions in protection levels were vehemently
opposed by manufacturing interests.  The
government was forced to ﬁnd its budget
balance in reduced debt service.  By 1821,
it became increasingly possible to do this.
Figure 3 shows the course of prices for
the major government “stocks,” namely
the price of 3 percent consols, Bank of
England stock, and East India Company
stock, over the period 1811-31.  The price
of consols, with their constant £3 interest
payment each year, reﬂects inversely the
default risk-free yield on long-term debt.
Its pattern shows clearly the increasing
pressures of war ﬁnance during the Napole-
onic Wars and the rocky road traversed by
the British debt overhang in the decade-
and-a-half following Waterloo.  In the
period encompassing the resumption of
specie payments, from late  summer 1820
Figure 1
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to late 1822, the price of all three securities
rose.  With their dividend rates maintained
at wartime levels, this meant the market
yields on each fell for ﬁrst-time investors.
The actual market yields available to inves-
tors in “the funds,” as they were known at
the time, are shown in Figure 4.  There was
clearly a period of marked recovery from the
trade crisis of 1819, when it was ﬁnally
determined that Bank of England notes
would again be convertible into gold at the
pre-suspension mint par.  A check occurred,
however, at the end of 1822 that lasted until
the spring of 1823.  Then the upward course
in price (and fall in yields) resumed for a
year, leveling off from March to September
1824.  The government’s success in manag-
ing its debt service problem after resump-
tion led to unusually low interest rates,
especially in 1824, the year preceding the
boom and bust of 1825.
The charts of prices and yields for “the
funds” illustrate nicely the problems created
by the transition from wartime to peacetime
finance.  The price patterns of the three
major securities available to risk-averse
British investors changed their relationship
from moving in synchrony to diverging
unpredictably.  The capital stock of both
the East India Company and the Bank of
England was invested in permanent govern-
ment debt, on which the government paid
regular interest.  Typically, the two char-
tered monopolies passed this interest pay-
ment through to their shareholders along
with some part of the proﬁts obtained from
their business activities.  The dividends
declared by the two had increased over the
eighteenth century but rose to all-time highs
during the Napoleonic Wars.  The Bank’s
business as the remitting agent for the gov-
ernment’s war ﬁnance has already been
mentioned.  The East India Company
gained from absorbing all the Asian trade
previously serviced by the French and
Dutch East India companies while the hos-
tilities lasted.  However, it was assessed a
huge annual sum by the government, pur-
portedly as compensation for the naval and
military services the government provided
for the protection of the East India Compa-
ny’s trade.  
A crossover in the prices of Bank of
England and East India Company stock
emerged clearly at the beginning of 1823
and widened through 1824.  Part of the
decline in the Bank’s stock was certainly
due to its decision in 1823 to drop its semi-
annual dividend from £5 per £100, which
had remained constant from 1807 through
1822, to £4 per £100.  It remained there
through 1838 before dropping again.10 The
Bank was steadily withdrawing from its dis-
count business, husbanding reserves, and
fending off Parliamentary pressures to
resume convertibility.  The East India Com-
pany, meanwhile, was in its ﬁnal phases as
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and faced with a mounting problem of
encroachment by noncompany English
traders in the exports of Indian goods to
Britain.  To counter this, the company was
allowed to maintain its monopoly on all British
trade with China.  It was in the 1820s that the
company’s import of trade goods from India
began to feel the pressure of competition—in
1826-27, they imported no goods whatsoever
from India.11 So it was the prospects of 
the continued China monopoly, and the earn-
ings on monopoly pricing of tea for British
consumers, that raised its market value in the
early 1820s and the decline in Indian trade
that lowered it in the mid-1820s.
In the early period from 1811 until
1819, by contrast, the London stock mar-
ket had established a stable price relationship
among the three securities.  The market yield
on East India Company stock was always the
highest of the three.  Presumably, this situa-
tion reﬂected the higher risk associated with
the stock.  The directors succeeded in keep-
ing the dividend rate high at a steady 10
percent per annum throughout this period,
but there was always a high risk that the gov-
ernment would either increase its charges on
the company or reduce its source of proﬁts,
say by returning Ceylon and Indonesia to the
Dutch.  The much lower market yield on
Bank stock reﬂected the perception that the
Bank’s business with the government was
assured and even less risky than the govern-
ment’s ﬁnancial affairs.  The Bank stock’s
market yields were always lower than
those available from the 3 percent consols,
at least until 1819.  This is not as counter-
intuitive as it may ﬁrst appear, because the
amount of Bank stock was ﬁxed by terms
of its most recent charter, while the supply
of “Three Per Cents” kept changing unpre-
dictably with the shocks to the govern-
ment’s ﬁnances.
All this changed, however, with the
Resumption Act of 1819.  The Bank’s stock
was assessed by the market to be then as
risky as that of the East India Company.
The success of actual resumption in full in
1821 appears to have reassured the market
that it was less risky than the stock of the
East India Company, whose fate was still a
matter of intense discussion and dispute.
At times, Bank stock even appeared less
risky than consols.  The crisis of 1825 dis-
rupted further the price and yield patterns.
Thereafter, consols were clearly judged the
safest security, East India Company stock
became priced with a higher risk premium
yet, and Bank stock was priced with a risk
premium that seems to have risen steadily
toward the fateful year of 1833, when its
charter was up for renewal.  
It may be helpful to put this argument,
derived from visual inspection of the price
and yield charts, in terms more familiar to
modern ﬁnancial analysts.  The visual evi-
dence is that the three major components
of “the funds” were co-integrated in the
period up to 1819 and presumably for a
number of years before 1811.  At some
point in the period of conﬂict between the
Bank and the government over the timing
and terms of resumption of cash payments,
from 1819 to 1821, the co-integrating rela-
tionship was broken.  Table 1 presents the
results of some formal testing of the statis-
tical hypotheses implied by this argument.12
The top panel demonstrates that the prices
of all three securities probably followed
random walks, both during the period
1811-20 and the period 1821-30.  This is
reassuring evidence that the market was at
least weakly efﬁcient in pricing each secu-
rity.  That is, there was no obvious trading
rule that investors could use to make con-
sistent proﬁts by knowing when prices
would rise or fall.
The second panel shows the results of
Dickey-Fuller tests to see if there existed co-
integrating relationships between each pair
of securities in each subperiod.  These indi-
cate that co-integration did exist between 3
percent consols and both Bank of England
stock and East India Company (EIC) stock
in the ﬁrst subperiod, 1811-20.  This is sen-
sible, as the dividends for both the Bank
and the EIC rested in large part on passing
through the interest payments each company
received from the government.  However, no
co-integration existed between Bank of Eng-
land and East India Company stock.  This
is also reasonable, because each company’s
additional earnings above the interest pay-
ments received from the government wereMAY/JUNE  1998
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determined independently of each other.
But even the co-integration of each compa-
ny’s stock with consols disappeared in the
second subperiod, 1821-30.
Because the length of each time period
is relatively short by the standards of time
series statistics, and the Dickey-Fuller sta-
tistics are relatively inefﬁcient for small
samples, the third panel uses the Johansen
technique for testing for the existence of a
co-integrating vector for each pair of secu-
rities.  Again, it shows that such vectors
likely did exist in the ﬁrst subperiod
between consols and both Bank of Eng-
land and East India stock, but not between
Bank of England stock and East India stock,
while no co-integration among any of the
funds is evident in the second period.  This
reafﬁrms my argument that the transition
from war ﬁnance to peace ﬁnance disrupted
all the relationships within the entire struc-
ture of the British ﬁnancial system, espe-
cially from 1821 on.
THE CRASH: FROM LATIN
AMERICAN BONDS TO
COUNTRY BANKNOTES
Eventually, the government managed
to bring the government budget back into
Co-Integration of the Funds and Market Index on the London Stock
Exchange: 1811-20 and 1821-30
Panel A.  Integration Diagnostics
1811-20  D-F Test  ADF  1821-30  D-F Test  ADF
Bank of England  –2.01  2.08  Bank  –1.35  –1.26
EIC  –1.02  –1.11  EIC  –1.40  –1.50
Threes  –1.68  –1.54  Threes  –2.30  –2.20
Panel B.  Dickey-Fuller Tests for Co-Integrating Regressions
1811-20  D-F Test  1821-30  D-F Test
Bank of England vs. EIC  –2.15  Bank vs. EIC  –1.80
Threes vs. Bank of England  –2.65*  Threes vs. Bank  –2.18
Threes vs. EIC  –4.27***  Threes vs. EIC  –2.01
Panel C.  Johansen Tests for Co-Integrating Vectors
1811-20  lMAX  lTRACE  1821-30  lMAX  lTRACE
Bank of England vs. EIC  5.33  7.08  Bank vs. EIC  5.02  7.09
Threes vs. Bank of England  19.27**  26.70***  Threes vs. Bank  5.59  8.10
Threes vs. EIC  15.35*  26.93***  Threes vs. EIC  5.09  6.81
NOTE: The Dickey-Fuller statistics reported under the integrating diagnostics and the co-integrating regressions are the t-statistics to test 
if the residuals are stationary.  Critical values are based on James Hamilton (1994), Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, 
Table B-6, Case 2, p. 763.
Critical values for the Johansen statistics are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
*  denotes 0.10 or less probability that there was a unit root,
**  a 0.05 or  less probability, and
***  a 0.01 or less probability.
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balance and even run a small surplus, thanks
mainly to reductions in the armed forces,
especially the withdrawal of occupation
forces from France after 1818.  But in the
period immediately following resumption of
the gold standard, the government continued
to make payments into the Sinking Fund,
which was used to make periodic purchases
of long-term debt at market prices and retire
it.  In effect, the Treasury was running open-
market operations that increased liquidity
in the economy.  It did this by issuing Exche-
quer bills to the Bank and then using its
credits with the Bank to retire some of the
funded, long-term debt, mainly consols.
Encouraged by the possibilities of retiring
high-interest debt and reducing expenditures
in this way, the government overreached in
1823.  At the end of that year, the govern-
ment converted £135 million of its 5 percent
bonds to 4 percent bonds.  It then continued
to take advantage of monetary ease early in
1824 by converting £80 million of the 4 per-
cent bonds to 31/2 percent.13
This had a double-barreled effect,
according to traditional accounts.  On the
one hand, British investors were disappointed
to be receiving lower yields on their hold-
ings in “the funds.”  “Even in that day
‘John Bull could not stand two per cent.’”14
On the other hand, the Bank of England was
now obliged to buy back the “deadweight”
part of the annuity yielding 31/2 percent that
the government had issued to cover its
expenditure on naval and military pensions
but had failed to sell to the public.  The
Bank had ample reserves to accomplish this,
having accumulated bullion for minting into
coins to replace the £1 and £2 notes it had
issued during the paper pound period
(1797-1821).  In fact, as late as October
1824 the Bank’s reserves amounted to fully
one-third of its liabilities, and by February
1825 it had increased its holdings of public
securities by 50 percent from the low of Feb-
ruary 1822.15 
This increase meant the Bank was also
conducting open-market operations, inad-
vertently and unwillingly, that added to the
monetary ease by placing cash in the pub-
lic’s hands in exchange for the government
securities they previously held.  This was
done at the same time the Bank was draw-
ing down its excessive gold reserves, a pro-
cess that also increased public liquidity.
John Easthope, a member of Parliament
and a stockbroker, in his testimony to the
Committee on the Bank of England Char-
ter in 1832, argued that while the increase
in the Bank’s note issue before 1825 was
not so large, it should have been decreased
in light of falling gold reserves.16 The epi-
sode he referred to was very likely the opera-
tions of Nathan Rothschild, who took
advantage of the falling price of gold in
Britain to borrow a large amount from the
Bank to sell in France in November 1824.17
Later, in mid-1825, when the Bank became
concerned about its falling reserves and the
fall of stock prices, Rothschild agreed to
repay the loan, restoring the gold in install-
ments spread over the months of June, July,
August, and September.18 The result was
exceptional monetary ease in 1824 and into
1825, and then contraction in mid-1825,
helping to bring on a payments crisis for
country banks. 
As Easthope argued, this was not the
behavior one would want from a bank
devoted to public service, although it was
understandable behavior for a bank more
concerned about the dividends it could pay
to its stockholders than the general state of
the monetary regime.  On this point, the
Bank’s defense was that the exchanges had
turned against Britain in 1825, so it was
necessary then to contract its note issue and
restore its gold reserves.  Yet the evidence
produced by the Bank itself for the commit-
tee indicates that the exchange rate was never
seriously threatened (see Figure 5), at least
no more than in earlier and later ﬂuctua-
tions that were not accompanied by ﬁnan-
cial panics.  Indeed, such ﬂuctuations as
occurred may have created proﬁt opportu-
nities for the House of Rothschild, which
the Bank was only too happy to share in
part without taking the risks incurred 
by Rothschild.  
The dysfunction of the ﬁnancial system
created at the top by the separation of opera-
tions and objectives between the Bank and
the Treasury spread even further, affecting
the country banks.  Confronted by the dis-
MAY/JUNE 1998
13Gayer, Rostow, Schwartz
(1975), vol. I, p. 185.
14Gayer, Rostow, Schwartz
(1975), vol. I, p. 185.
15Pressnell (1956), p. 480.
16Great Britain (1968), p. 469,
item 5790.
17Bank of England, Committee of
the Treasury Minute Book, Oct.
29, 1823, to April 12, 1826,
fo. 117.  Rothschild on Nov.
30, 1824, requested a loan of
£300 or £500,000 of bar gold
at 77/10 1/2 per oz. and
paid 3 1/2 percent per annum
with collateral of stock.  “As I
may require about £225,000
value of Bar gold tomorrow, I
beg to mention it to you, in
order to facilitate the delivery.”
The Bank’s Court of the
Treasury complied with this
application.
18Bank of England, Committee of
the Treasury Minute Book, May
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tress caused by severe and unanticipated
deﬂation in 1819-21, the Treasury did not
wish to renew its reliance upon the Bank
for buying Exchequer bills, as it had done
in 1817 in order to ﬁnance public works
projects in the manufacturing districts and
Ireland.19 Instead, it allowed the country
banks to continue to issue notes of small
denominations, deferring their elimination
from circulation for 10 years.  Instead of
disappearing from the money supply in
1823, as previously provided in legislation
of 1816 (which mandated their termination
within two years after the Bank resumed
cash payments), such notes were allowed
to continue circulating until 1833.
The country banks, already providing
necessary ﬁnance to manufacturing districts
throughout England by the second half of
the eighteenth century, found their business
prospects greatly enhanced during the Napol-
eonic Wars.20 Part of the reason was the
expansion of heavy manufacturing in the
Midlands and South Wales, part was the
growth of foreign trade from outports other
than London, and much was due to the role
of country banks in remitting to London
the government’s revenues from the land
tax, the stamp tax, and the income tax while
it was in effect.  The end of the war reduced
the basis for all these activities and eliminated
the income tax.  Moreover, the continuing
threat of cash resumption by the Bank of
England meant that the proﬁtable note-issue
business would have to be wound up and
replaced by some other form of revenue.
Into the breach stepped the stockjob-
bers and brokers operating in the London
stock exchange.  Their business, too, was
greatly enhanced by the incredible increase
in government debt issued during the wars
of 1793-1815.  It was interrupted brieﬂy
by the crisis of 1810, which foretold the
difﬁculties the stock exchange traders
would face when the war ended.  In 1811,
the response of stock traders was to enlarge
greatly the list of securities available for
investors in the London stock  exchange.
Canal stocks were especially favored,
although a few other joint-stock companies
were listed—iron-tracked railways, docks,
waterworks, and a few  gasworks.  Trading
in most of these public-utility stocks was
quite limited, however, as most share-
holders preferred to hold them for their
value as long-term assets and for their
voting power.  The various forms of gov-
ernment debt remained the most lucrative
source of commission and speculative
income for traders.
Latin American Securities
The withdrawal of foreigners from the
British national debt after the war, how-
ever, removed one class of customers that
had been most active in trading, while the
rise in the price of government bonds
reduced their attractiveness as sources of
interest income to the rentier  classes.  The
traders on the stock exchange began to
develop a variety of new assets to maintain
their customer base and their personal
incomes.  New government issues that mim-
icked in form the British 3 percent consol
were offered by the peacetime governments
in France, Prussia, Spain, Denmark, Russia,
and Austria.  The  military successes of the
revolting Spanish American colonies stim-
ulated offerings of government bonds from
the new Latin American states as well, fol-
lowed by stocks in newly privatized mines.
Many more gasworks were listed as every
community in England rushed to provide
its residents and businesses the gas light-
19Hilton (1977), pp. 82-87.
20Pressnell’s classic study (1956)
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ing that was proving so successful in
London.  A number of insurance companies
were created when entrepreneurs saw that
the existing companies seemed especially
able to proﬁt from the ease of credit and the
lack of attractive alternative assets to govern-
ment debt.
But the most attractive assets offered
were those from Latin America, following
the success of the French 5 percent rentes.
Following the ﬁnal defeat of Napoleon at
Waterloo in 1815, capital ﬂowed back to
the Continent from Great Britain.  Foreign
holdings of British debt diminished rapidly,
the price of consols rose as the supply
diminished, and prices of Bank and East India
stock rose in tandem.  British investors used
to safe returns ranging between 4 and 6 per-
cent for the past 20 years now found their
options limited to yields between 3.5 and
4.5 percent.  The opportunities for invest-
ment in new issues of French 5 percent rentes
were more attractive than continuing their
holdings in consols.  Figure 6 shows that 
the rentes  maintained a steady return over
5 percent throughout the crisis period and
offered a stable alternative to the British
funds.  Baring Brothers and Co., by its suc-
cessful ﬁnance of Wellington’s army in 1815,
had established itself as the dominant mer-
chant bank in England.  By undertaking  the
ﬂotation of the ﬁrst two issues of French
rentes  sold to pay the reparations and sup-
port Wellington’s occupation forces,  Barings
became the “Sixth Power” in Europe, accord-
ing to the Duc de Richelieu.21 From February
to July 1817,  Barings disposed of three loans,
the ﬁrst two at a net price of 53 percent of
par for 100 million francs each and the
third at 65 percent of par, which raised 115
million francs.  Yet, according to the historian
of the Baring ﬁrm, no disturbance  in the
British trade balance or  in French reserves
seems to have occurred—the inﬂow of cap-
ital to France from Britain resulting from
the issue of rentes  seems to have been offset
by indemnity payments and army contracts
from France to Britain.22 (What the histo-
rian has missed, of course, is the fall in the
exchange rate of the British pound that
occurred at the time; the pound was still
floating after the  suspension of convertibility
in February 1797.)  From this success for
British investors in foreign investment with
the French rentes, it has traditionally been
argued, came increased enthusiasm for other
forms of investment, ﬁrst in the bonds issued
by the new government of Spain established
in 1820, and then in the bonds issued by the
new states emerging in Latin America.23
The collapse of Spanish control over its
American empire during the Napoleonic
Wars led to a variety of  independent states
being formed out of the former colonies by
1820.  Battling one another for control over
strategic transport routes, mainly rivers and
ports, and over state enterprises, mainly
mines, each appealed to foreign investors
as a source of government ﬁnance and as a
means to substitute foreign expertise and
technology for the vanquished Spanish.
Their government bonds and their mining
shares found a ready market in the London
Stock Exchange, which had become the
dominant marketplace for ﬁnance capital
in the world during the Napoleonic Wars.
The loan bubble of 1822-25 ensued, even-
tually giving British foreign-bond holders
their ﬁrst experience with defaults by sov-
ereign states.  None of the new Latin Amer-
ican states emerging from the remains of
the Spanish empire (Brazil remained part of
the Portuguese empire) found the means,
whether by exports or taxes, to service the
debts they had incurred in London.  Mean-
21Jenks (1927), p. 36.  
See also Ziegler (1988), 
pp. 100-11.
22Jenks (1927), p. 37.
23While the focus for foreign
loans was mostly on Spain and
Spanish America, Greece
received a loan and much-need-
ed publicity for its then-prema-
ture efforts to break away from
Turkish rule.  More than 50
years later, when the Greek
government was attempting to
assure the international com-
munity it would go on a gold
standard, part of its commit-
ment was to resume payment
on these initial bonds!
Figure 6
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24Dawson (1990) provides a
readable account of this episode,
but Marichal (1989) puts it into
a longer-run Latin American per-
spective.  Brazilian bonds never
went into default, which is why
their prices remained the high-
est among the Latin American
bonds in the late 1820s.  They
were, in fact, the only ones
issued by the Rothschilds.
None of their government bond
issues for Austria, Belgium,
Naples, Prussia, or Russia
defaulted in this period
(Doubleday, p. 281).
25Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
(1975), vol. I, p. 189.
26Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
(1975), vol. I, p. 408, fn. 8,
and Mitchell (1976), p. 402.
These are nominal values in
each case, but government
debt was then trading at close
to par, so its market value was
roughly the same. 
27Beginning probably in January
1825, Wetenhall apparently
also began publishing a daily
stock price list (No. 171 was
for July 8, 1825), with slightly
different coverage than that
provided in his ofﬁcially sanc-
tioned, twice-weekly price
sheet (which was No. 11,131
for July 8, 1825)—a bit of
circumstantial evidence for the
information-asymmetry theory,
but I have located only one
issue of the daily list for this
period.
28Jenks (1927), p. 49.
29Ziegler (1988), pp. 102-07.  
while, the net proceeds they had received
after the bonds were sold at discount—and
after they had paid large commissions up
front—to the London investment houses
were dissipated rapidly in military con-
flicts with neighboring states.24
From 1822, when both Chile and
Colombia ﬂoated bond issues with London
agents, an increasing number of Latin Amer-
ican governments tried to ﬁnd the means
for ﬁnancing their transition to indepen-
dence from the flush pockets of British
investors.  The bonds they issued, in terms
of the amounts actually paid up, as distin-
guished from the amounts actually received
by the governments, were the largest single
category of new investment in the London
capital market in this period.25 It is true,
even so, that the amount was small relative
to the remaining sum of the British govern-
ment’s funded debt—£43 million compared
with £820 million.26
Figure 6 compares the prices of several
bond issues of the emerging South Amer-
ican states, as given in James Wetenhall’s
semiweekly Course of the Exchange.27 At
the peak of the stock market boom, there
was surprising convergence in the prices of
all the Latin American bonds.  It was only
in the ensuing two years that information
on the ﬁscal capacity of the individual gov-
ernments and their respective economic
bases enabled the London market to distin-
guish among them.  Mexico and the Andean
countries were clearly marked to be disas-
ter cases by the end of 1828, while already
Argentina and Brazil were demonstrating
their attractiveness to British investors, an
allure that would increase until the Baring
crisis of 1890. 
The pricing pattern of foreign govern-
ment bonds displayed in Figure 6 is a clas-
sic illustration of the so-called “lemons”
problem that can occur in emerging ﬁnan-
cial markets.  In this case, it appears that
investors in the London market priced the
Latin American bonds at a substantial dis-
count so that the typical 5 percent or 6 per-
cent yield on par value could provide a
substantial risk premium compared with
both the British funds and the now-
seasoned and solid French government
debt. Until further information came in
from newspapers or merchants’ letters from
the respective countries concerning their
ﬁscal situation and credit arrangements,
however, they all looked much alike, and all
were priced at punitively low levels.  This
discouraged higher-quality governments,
perhaps Brazil, from issuing debt until the
House of Rothschild had assured itself that
adequate provision was forthcoming for ser-
vicing it.  But it also encouraged lower-quality
governments, perhaps Peru, to issue debt
early on.  Indeed, at one point in October
1822, it induced the Scottish adventurer,
Gregor McGregor, to issue bonds from an
imaginary government of Poyais, presum-
ably located around Honduras.  On October
29, 1822, the ofﬁcial Course of the Exchange
quoted Poyais scrip for 6 percent bonds at
811/2 percent of par, compared with Peru’s 
6 percent bonds at 863/4, Chile’s at 84, and
Colombia’s at 86! 
Only as more information came in or
as investors began to pull out of higher-
risk investments and seek safer, better-
quality assets did price differences begin to
show up.  This change began to occur in
the fall of 1825 for the new government
issues from Latin America; it did not affect
the now-seasoned and secure French rentes
at all.  While the history of the various
bond issues is extremely colorful, it appears
that Leland Jenks’ assessment of many years
ago is still fundamentally correct—their
main effect was to enrich some issuing agents
and impoverish or imperil others, including
the redoutable Barings.  Jenks notes that the
typical arrangement mimicked that devised
by the Goldschmidts for the Colombian loan
of 1824, whereby “[t]hey received a commis-
sion for raising the money, a commission for
spending it, and a commission for paying it
back.”28 On the other hand, the most recent
historian of Barings argues that they lost
money on the Argentina loan by buying back
large amounts of it in a futile effort to main-
tain the market price of the bonds and lost
even more on the ill-advised investments in
Mexico of Francis Baring, the second son of
Alexander Baring.29 In the case of both the
Rothschilds and the Barings, however, it
appears that the sums risked were relativelysmall and the risks generally appreciated
even by an inexperienced British public.  We
have to look elsewhere for an explanation of
the 1825 speculative bubble and collapse,
perhaps in the new domestic companies that
were formed.
Domestic Securities
As the London stock market had proved
attractive for the new issues of debt by the
restored European governments and the rev-
olutionary Latin American governments, by
1824 a much wider variety of newly formed
joint-stock corporations offered their shares
to London investors.  In the words of a
contemporary observer, “bubble schemes
came out in shoals like herring from the
Polar Seas.”30 The success of three compa-
nies ﬂoated to exploit the mineral resources
of Mexico—the Real del Monte Association,
the United Mexican Company, and the
Anglo-American Company led to ﬂotations
of domestic projects in early 1824.  In Feb-
ruary 1824, the Barings and Rothschilds
cooperated to found the Alliance British and
Foreign Life & Fire Insurance Company.  It
enjoyed an immediate, enormous success.31
In March there were 30 bills before Parlia-
ment to establish some kind of joint-stock
enterprise, whether a private undertaking
for issuing insurance or opening a mine, or
a public utility such as gas or waterworks, or
a canal, dock, or bridge.  In April there were
250 such bills.32
The limitation of joint-stock enterprises
to these ﬁelds arose from the limitations,
first, of the Bubble Act of 1720, which for-
bade joint-stock corporations from engaging
in activities other than those speciﬁcally
stated in their charters; second, of common
law, which made stockholders in co-partner-
ships with transferable shares (i.e., unin-
corporated joint-stock enterprises) liable in
unlimited amount, proportional to their
shares in the equity of the company; and,
third, of the limited liability and ease of
transfer for shareholders in mines created
on the “cost-book” system.33 They were
subject only to calls up to the capitalization
authorized by the cost-book, which required
neither deed, charter, nor act of Parliament
to establish.  Despite the resistance of Par-
liament to incorporating new companies
with limited liability, the speculative mania
continued with new projects ﬂoated daily.
Speculation was encouraged on the possi-
bility that an enterprise might receive a
charter, based on the connections in
Parliament of its board of directors.  
The extent of the speculative fervor
and its lack of permanent effect was spelled
out by a contemporary stockbroker, Henry
English, and his analysis has remained
authoritative to this day.  Brieﬂy, English
listed 624 companies that were ﬂoated in
the years 1824 and 1825.  They had a capi-
talization of £372,173,100.  By 1827, only
127 of these existed with a capitalization
of £102,781,600, of which only £15,185,950
had been paid in, but the market value had
sunk even lower to only £9,303,950.34 But
even at the height of the enthusiasm for
new issues, the total capital paid in had
amounted to no more than £49 million.35
Compared with the stock of government
debt available (£820 million), this amount
was still almost as limited in scale as the
investments in Latin American securities.
Perhaps we have to look still further for
an explanation of the events of 1825.  The
role of the country banks, in particular,
needs to be examined.
The Country Banks
The expansion of the economy contin-
ued through 1823 and 1824.  By April 1825
at the latest, the stock market boom reached
its peak (Figure 7),36 and the resulting drop
in collateral values, combined with a con-
traction by the Bank of England in its note
issue, began to create jitters in the money
market.  By July, city bankers were begin-
ning to be more cautious.  In September,
reports of difﬁculties by country banks in
Devon and Cornwall began to appear.  All
country banks were then faced with the sea-
sonal strain that occurred each autumn.
Government tax revenues were required to
be remitted to London in the autumn before
interest payments on government debt were
made in December.  This caused more coun-
try banks to fail in October and November
30Hunt (1936), p. 30, quoting 
a letter to The Times, April 20,
1826.
31Hunt (1936), p. 32.
32Hunt (1936), p. 32.
33Burt (1984), pp. 74-81
describes the cost-book system
and its advantages for investors
at this time.
34As reproduced in Hunt (1936),
p. 46.
35Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
(1975), vol. I, p. 414.
36According to my own value-
weighted index of 50 of the
most important stocks traded
on the London Stock Exchange,
the peak occurs in March.
Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
(1975), using different
weights for the same stocks,
put the peak in April, although
the actual peak if mine stocks
are included occurs in January
1825. 
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in 1825.  When the major London banks
of Wentworth, Chaloner, & Rishworth and
Pole, Thornton & Co. failed on December
8 and 13, respectively, and forced dozens
of correspondent country banks to suspend
payments, a general run began on country
banks.  These banks, in turn, came to their
London banks for cash, and the London
banks turned to the Bank of England.
Finally,  the directors of the Bank woke 
up to the crisis and began to discount 
bills and notes for their customers as fast
as they could with diminished staff and
resources.  The pressure on the Bank lasted
for the rest of December, depleted their
bullion reserves, and forced them to issue
small £1 and £2 notes again but did not
force them to suspend payments as they
had feared.
The credit collapse led to widespread
bank failures (73 out of the 770 banks in
England and even three out of the 36 in
Scotland)37 and a massive wave of bank-
ruptcies in the rest of the economy, reaching
an unprecedented peak in April 1826.38 The
Bank of England and the London private
banks joined forces for once by blaming
both the speculative boom and the subse-
quent credit collapse on excessive note
issue by the country banks.  They argued
that the ease of note issue had encouraged
the more careless or unscrupulous part-
ners in country banks to invest in high-
risk, high-return ﬁnancial ventures such as
the Poyais scrip that were being offered on
the London capital market.  The historian
of British country banks, L.S. Pressnell, dis-
counts this factor as the driving force both
in the boom and in the timing of the col-
lapse.  Relying on evidence supplied by
Henry Burgess, secretary of the Committee
of Country Bankers, to the Bank Charter
Committee of 1832, Pressnell notes that many
country banks did increase their note issue
substantially between July 1824 and July
1825.  Burgess’ unweighted index of the
indexes of note issues provided to him by 122
country banks for the month of July in each
year from 1818 through 1825 gave an overall
average increase of 6.7 percent in the ﬁnal
year before the crisis, while 50 of the banks
showed increases of more than 10 percent.39
Figure 8 shows, however, that the ﬁnal
level, reached in July 1825, was barely above
the initial level of July 1818, which had
fallen sharply until 1822.  No doubt the
country banks expanded their note issue
in the years immediately preceding the
crash.  But much of this expansion was
simply restoring note issue that had been
reduced in response to Parliament’s acts of
1816 and 1819.  What is missing, of course,
is evidence on the extent to which the ini-
tial withdrawal of notes was compensated
for by an increase in demand deposits.  If
there was a one-to-one compensation (which
is highly unlikely), then the expansion of
note issues in 1824 and 1825 may have
helped fuel the speculative ﬁres burning
on the London stock exchange.  However,
the expansion may also have been compen-
sated by a reduction of deposits.  Burgess’
ﬁgures were collected from banks oper-
ating in 1830, which clearly had not been
among the unfortunate ﬁrms that disap-
peared in the aftermath of the crisis.  If
those ﬁrms were much more aggressive
than the survivors that appear in Burgess’
large sample, then the country banks may
remain indicted as a major contributing
cause of the crisis of 1825.
Pressnell gives balance sheets from a
handful of country banks that were oper-
ating in this period and whose records have
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SOURCE: Compiled by author from quotes for 50 companies in the Course of the Exchange.ford had an unusually rich set of accounts
covering the entire period from 1800 to 1845.
On the asset side of the balance sheet, this
bank increased its cash holding substantially
in 1821-23, and then greatly in 1824.  By
the end of 1825, however, its holdings had
fallen from £106,559 to only £31,201, the
lowest level since the crisis year of 1810.
While the bank had begun to place surplus
funds with a London bill-broker in 1823,
this account remained quite small until the
1830s.  Total assets fell sharply in 1825,
from £152,585 to £109,079, but they fell
less than the cash account.  The difference
came primarily in a doubling of the bank’s
balance with its London correspondent,
from £33,877 to £66,256.40 Apparently,
this bank was one of the solvent banks
whose surplus funds could be channeled
to others through the intermediation of 
its London bank.  
On the liability side of the Barnard &
Co. bank, the note issues followed much
the same path as the average shown by Bur-
gess for his sample of 122 country banks
(see Figure 8).  The most striking difference
occurs in 1825, but this is mostly explained
by the fall that must have occurred in the
note issue of all the country banks between
July, for the average of the 122 banks, and
December, for Barnard & Co.  As far as Bar-
nard’s deposits are concerned, they fell as
well from 1818 through 1823, but not as
much as note issues. Deposits rose in 1824
more than note issues, and although they
fell in 1825 as well, they ended the year of
1825 at a higher level than note issues.  This
was a bank that stayed clear of the specula-
tive frenzy going on in London, weathered
the storm and survived to prosper after-
wards.  Its good fortune was due, no doubt,
to the large loss sustained by the founder,
Joseph Barnard, the one time he did place
funds in speculative issues available in Lon-
don.  That loss occurred in the crisis of 1810,
and Barnard’s “warning to those who may
succeed me” from that incident was appar-
ently heeded in 1825.41
If the record of accomplishment of Bar-
nard & Co. may be dismissed as unrepre-
sentative of the “problem” country banks,
we can also examine the accounts of a coun-
try bank that did most of its business by
note issue and that failed in the wave of
bankruptcies occurring in December 1825.
Figure 9 shows the gross level of £1 notes
issued over the period 1817-25 of one of
the unfortunates—the country bank of
Sarah Crickett in Chelmsford, Essex
County.42 These do not take account of
notes that may have been retired, but by
plotting the highest number found for each
date (notes were issued weekly) on a semi-
logarithmic scale, we can get a sense of how
this bank, which seemed to rely more on
note issue than deposit accounts, responded
to the vagaries caused by the Bank of Eng-
land’s return to the gold standard in 1821.
At ﬁrst glance, this bank shows quite a
different pattern of note issuing from that of
the successful banks shown in Figure 8.  At
the outset of business in 1817, it increased
its issue of £1 notes very rapidly (it’s inter-
esting that these were still outstanding in
1826 when the holders turned them in to
the Bankruptcy Commission), as a startup
bank might be expected to do.  But then it
increased issues rapidly again in 1819,
when it made sense for country banks to
start withdrawing their notes, given that the
Bank of England had resumed cash pay-
ments, and the Act of 1816 mandated that
country banknotes under £5 should cease
entirely two years later.  The steady rise of
notes in the early 1820s does not show any
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41Pressnell (1956), pp. 433-34
42Public Record Ofﬁce, B3/1008
and B3/1010-1029 contains
the ﬁles of the Bankruptcy
Commission for Sarah Crickett
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similar acceleration until the end of 1825,
when the crisis was breaking.
Given the bank’s location in one of the
richest agricultural districts of England, and
the prevalence of small tradesmen and far-
mers among its noteholders, it may be that
the note surges shown in 1817 and 1819
reﬂect local harvest conditions more than
responses to the changes occurring in the
London money market.  They do occur in
the fall of those years.  It must be  empha-
sized that these totals are cumulative and
take no account of notes that may have
been withdrawn when presented to the
bank, so they are not comparable to the
net issues outstanding, shown in Figure 8.
By the end of the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion for Crickett’s Bank in the mid-1830s,
18 shillings in the pound (i.e., 90 percent)
of the claims had been deposited in the
assignee’s account.  Given the small sums
claimed by most creditors, the length of
time taken by the Bankruptcy Commission,
and the location of the assignee’s account
at the Bank of England in London, much
of the funds available for payment were not
disbursed—a situation that was convenient
for the commissioners and the assignee,
who could then cover their charges very
easily from the account.  But for our pur-
poses, the apparent willingness of so many
note  holders to retain their notes for long
periods  of time, plus the bank’s basic sound-
ness when  its claims and assets were ﬁnally
realized by the Bankruptcy Commission,
indicates that this particular failure was an
unfortunate victim of circumstances, not a
contributor to the crisis.
The Bank of England
To understand the internal causes of the
crisis of 1825, therefore, we must turn back
to the role of the Bank of England—in par-
ticular, the relationship between its activi-
ties as a potential lender of last resort and
the wave of bankruptcies that disrupted
English commerical life for years following
the crisis of 1825.  This ground was covered
many years ago by Norman Silberling (1923).
He simply counted the number of bank-
ruptcy commissions opened as recorded in
the London Gazette.  These have some
weaknesses as discussed in Mitchell (1976,
pp. 245-46), Duffy (1985, pp. 331-35), and
Marriner (1989), but they are still useful as
general indicators of the incidence and
timing of bankruptcy over regions and
industries.  The problems arise from Bri-
tish bankruptcy law, which conﬁned the
possibility of bankruptcy to ﬁrms engaged
in trade, excluding farms, factories, and
the other professions.  The latter were cov-
ered by the much harsher law of insolvency,
but in case of difﬁculty they did what they
could to come under  bankruptcy law.  To do
this, they had to be engaged to a signiﬁcant
extent in trade, stop payment on debts
amounting to over £100, and refuse in front
of witnesses to pay a legitimate creditor.
The creditor would then petition with other
major creditors to open a commission; this
was “striking a docket.”  If the Bankruptcy
Court judged that the creditors had a legiti-
mate case, they would “seal a commission,”
which would authorize a trio of commis-
sioners to begin collecting evidence of the
bankrupt’s assets and liabilities.  As this was
an expensive procedure, which could last
for years and eat up the remaining assets
of the bankrupt in commissioners’ fees,
mutual efforts were often made to settle the
dispute before the proceedings began.  Once
they began, the “commission opened.”
Figure 10, from Duffy (1985), shows the
Figure 9
Low  High
SOURCE: Public Record Office, B/3/1029.  Sample figures extracted by author.




One Pound Notes Issuedannual numbers of dockets struck, commis-
sions sealed, and commissions opened.
Regardless of which measure of ﬁnancial
distress is taken, the crash of the London
stock market at the end of 1825 resulted in
record numbers of business failures.
The 1825 spike is all the more anom-
alous for coming at the end of a period of
declining numbers of bankruptcies, with
no major changes in trade direction or pol-
icy evident, much less any sign of renewed
warfare.  From 1794 on, Silberling  con-
structed quarterly totals of the advances
made by the Bank of England to its private
customers and the government.  From his
comparison of the pattern of advances with
that of banknote issue, prices, and bankrupt-
cies, he concluded that advances were a
much better barometer of prices and busi-
ness conditions than banknote issues and,
moreover, that in general the claim of the
Bank’s ofﬁcers that they followed a real-bills
doctrine—responding passively to the
demands of business for credit on realized
trade contracts—was justiﬁed.  The excep-
tional decrease in advances after 1819,
driven by the Bank’s determination to accu-
mulate sufﬁcient bullion to validate the
resumption of convertibility of its banknotes
into specie at the pre-war par in terms of
gold, did not show up in bankruptcies.43
Closer examination of the relationship
between advances and bankruptcies from
1819 through 1830, shown in Figure 11,
shows possible encouragement of specula-
tive movements in 1823 and 1824 but mod-
eration in 1825 until the Bank responded to
the crisis at the end of the year by increas-
ing the total of advances enormously in the
first quarter of 1826.  Afterwards, Silber-
ling’s ﬁgures show a distinctive inverse pat-
tern, which is so short in duration that it
could again be consistent with the real-bills
story, especially if we allow a lag of six
months to a year from the actual credit
restriction to the recorded opening of a
bankruptcy commission.
Parliament collected evidence in the
years afterward to determine the pattern of
bankruptcies.  Table 2 distinguishes town
and country bankruptcies opened within
the total of commissions sealed from 1822
through 1833.  Again, 1826 shows up as the
crisis year, but what is striking here is the
much more dramatic jump in the country
bankruptcies, a situation that continued
afterwards with a consistently higher num-
ber of bankruptcies for country banks.  More-
over, bankruptcies of banks located within
65 miles of London totaled only 38 from
February 7, 1824, to March 22, 1832, com-
pared to a total of 116 for banks located
outside the 65-mile radius from London.
Only 12 of the London banks failed in the
crisis period from December 13, 1825, to
March 11, 1826, while 52 of the country
banks failed from December 12, 1825, to
43Doubleday rants about the
widespread distress created
from passage of Peel’s Act in
1819 until its ﬁnal full effect in
May 1823, “but, in fact, his
prime example of distress . . .
calculated to tear in pieces,
almost, the heart of every just
and sensible man that reads
it,” deals with the loss of a
country estate purchased with
wartime proﬁts by the son of 
a trader who went bankrupt 
in 1822.  Clearly, this was not 
a general condition.
MAY/JUNE  1998














SOURCE: Duffy (1985), p. 399.





















1819  1820  1826  1827  1828  1829  1830 1821  1822  1823  1824  1825
Bankruptcies and Bank  
of England Advances44Bank of England,  TVC3/11
G4/48, fo. 150.
MAY/JUNE  1998
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
69
March 11, 1826.  These bankruptcy records
indicate further that the ﬁnancial panic
was transmitted through the credit chan-
nels of Great Britain, radiating out from
the London capital market, and had its
ﬁnal impact in the trade and industry of
the countryside through the liquidity
crunch exerted upon the country banks.
Picking up the Pieces
The question naturally arises: Could
the Bank of England have prevented this
ﬁnancial disaster, say, by acting earlier and
as a monopoly bank bearing more respon-
sibility to the public than to its stock-
holders?  It must bear part of the blame for
the expansion of the money supply that
apparently arose in 1823-24 and especially
for failing to offset the monetary expan-
sion occurring elsewhere.  But if, as Duffy
suggests, it was the Bank’s drawing account
activity rather than its note issue that
played the strongest role in easing or con-
straining the credit conditions in the
London money market, then the Bank of
England can be no more culpable than the
country banks.  The sums advanced from
the Drawing Ofﬁce plummeted after resump-
tion of cash payments in 1821, and the Bank
of England restricted drawings through most
of 1825, never rising to the pre-resumption
level until the ﬁrst quarter of 1826.  But this
analysis simply casts the Bank of England in
the role of just another bank, albeit much
larger and more inﬂuential.  If it was sup-
posed, through its ability, to combine
up-to-date, authoritative information from
the worlds of ﬁnance, commerce, and govern-
ment policy, it might be expected to have
played an earlier, more constructive role.  In
fact, the evidence from the minutes of the
Court of Directors of the Bank indicate that
the Bank was taken by surprise and respon-
ded with much too little, much too late.
The Bank of England
The ﬁrst mention of the crisis occurs
on December 8, 1825, when “The Gover-
nor [Cornelius Buller] acquainted the Court
that he had with the concurrence of the
Deputy Governor [John Baker Richards]
and several of the Committee of Treasury
afforded assistance to the banking house of
Sir Peter Pole, etc.”44 This episode is
Bankruptcy Commissions Sealed (total) and Opened  
(town and country): 1822-32
Commissions  Town Commissions  Country Commissions
Year  Sealed  Opened  Opened
1822  1,419  468  534
1823  1,250  532  396
1824  1,240  574  396
1825  1,475  683  448
1826  3,307  1,229  1,220
1827  1,688  671  742
1828  1,519  601  620
1829  2,150  809  910
1830  1,720  661  748
1831  1,886  692  770
1832  1,772  643  740
SOURCE: British Parliamentary Papers, 1833, XXXI, p. 342.
Table 2described in vivid detail by the sister of
Henry Thornton Jr., the active partner of
Pole, Thornton & Co. at the time.  On the
previous Saturday, the governor and deputy
governor counted out £400,000 in bills
personally to Henry Thornton, Jr., at the
Bank without any clerks present.45 All this
was done to keep it secret so that other
large London banks would not press their
claims as well.  A responsible lender of last
resort would have publicized the cash infu-
sion to reassure the public in general.
Instead, the run on Pole & Thornton con-
tinued unabated, causing the company to
fail by the end of the week.  Then the deluge
of demands for advances by other banks
overwhelmed the Bank’s Drawing Ofﬁce.
Table 3 shows the breakdown of the
Bank of England’s discounts by branch of
trade.  I have ordered them by the largest
amounts disbursed in the quarter ending
in December 1825, when “Bankers” domi-
nate.  However, as late as November, the
bankers were not unusually present in the
Bank of England’s ofﬁces.  Indeed, it appears
that the merchants engaged in the trades
with “Hamburg, France, Spain, Portugal,
South America, the Baltic, and General Mer-
chants” were especially pressing in their
demands upon the Bank in the quarter
ending in June 1825.  No other branch of
trade showed unusual demands until the
final month of 1825.  But this alone should
have warned the Bank of repercussions that
would follow.  If it was the South American
merchants who accounted for the bulk of
the increased demands for accommodation
in June, this gave the Bank much better
warning than could have been available to
any country banker that remittances from
South America were in disarray.  This
would affect the disbursement of divi-
dends upon mining stocks as well as
interest on government bonds.  Instead of
reacting to this information in a construc-
tive way, however, the Bank decided it
would be risky to advance funds on some
categories of collateral, kept its rate of dis-
count high compared with the rest of the
market, and raised its rate of discount back
to 5 percent in early December 1825, when
demands became increasingly urgent.  In
the interim, the Bank chose to respond to
the lack of discounting business by cutting
costs.  The number of clerks in the Drawing
Ofﬁce had fallen from 17 to 11 by February
1825, and of these 11, four were regularly
sent to serve in other departments.46
The Bank of England’s ﬁrst proactive
response at the level of the Court of Direc-
tors did not appear until January 12, 1826.
At that meeting the court appointed a com-
mittee to report on the practicality and expe-
diency of establishing branch banks.  The
very next week, the committee reported
“Branch banks would be highly expedient.”
The reasons it gave, however, were quite
revealing of the ruling mentality among
Bank of England leaders at the time.  The
beneﬁts were listed ﬁrst for the Bank of Eng-
land and then for the general public (see Table
4).  The practicality was not an issue, given
Scotland’s experience for 80 years, not to men-
tion the success of the Bank of the United
States, the Bank of Ireland, and the recently
established Provincial Bank of Ireland.
In this report, the Bank of England was
clearly responding belatedly to the govern-
ment’s decision to force it to open branches
and to promote large, joint-stock banks.
The week after the report was laid before
the court, the governor presented to the
directors the letter he had received from
Lord Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury,
and Mr. Frederick Robinson, Chancellor of
the Exchequer.  The arguments laid out in
the letter show that the government, in
this instance, was determined to work
around the Bank rather than through it.
The Liverpool-Robinson letter began with
the assertion, “there can be no doubt that
the Principal Source of it [the recent dis-
tress] is to be found in the rash spirit of
Speculation which has pervaded the Coun-
try for some time, supported, fostered, and
encouraged by the Country Banks.”47 So,
the letter continued, it seemed advisable to
repeal the authority of the country banks
to issue small notes and return to a gold cir-
culation. This action would spread pres-
sure on the exchanges over a wider surface
and make it felt earlier—a clear reference
to the Bank’s negligence in 1825.  But this
alone would not sufﬁce; after all, a similar
45Forster (1956), p. 117.
46Bank of England, C 35/2
4783/2, No. 2,  “Special
Discount Committee from 12
Feb. 1811 to 26 Jan. 1830
inclusive,”  fo. 159.  Later, the
committee recommended a fur-
ther reduction in the number of
clerks (fos. 164-65).
47Bank of England, TVC3/11
G4/48,  fos. 201-2.
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convulsion had occurred in 1793 when
there were no small notes and Scotland
had “escaped all the convulsions which
have occurred in the Money Market of
England for the last thirty-ﬁve years,
though Scotland during the whole of that
time has had a circulation  of One-Pound
Notes.”  In the past, the Bank of England
“may have been in Itself and by Itself fully
equal to all the important Duties & Opera-
tions conﬁded to it,” but “the rise of
country banks alone shows it is no longer
up to the tasks required  from the increased
wealth and new wants of the Country.”48
The government proposed two reme-
dies: The Bank should establish branches
of its own, and it should give up its exclu-
sive privilege to issue notes within a cer-
tain distance from the Metropolis.  The
ﬁrst suggestion was impracticable, in the
government’s view, and it was obvious that
Parliament would never agree to an exten-
sion of the Bank’s privileges in London.
All in all, the government’s proposed legis-
lation would remove pressure from the
Bank, and it would still have the govern-
ment’s business and be the only establish-
ment at which the dividends on the  national
Amount of Each Branch of Trade in Discounts  
(thousands of pounds sterling)
Branch Mar  Jun  Sept  Nov  Dec
Bankers  273  595  608  699  3,408
Hamburg, Fr., Sp., Port, S. Amer., Baltic
and general merchants  411  1,809  1,094  1,238  2,955
Tea dealers, grocers, and 
sugar reﬁners  275  334  324  470  959
Russian merchants and dealers in
hemp and tallow  46  95  154  243  733
Blackwell Hall factors and warehousemen
woolen drapers  188  337  400  441  701
Linen drapers and Manchester 
warehousemen  220  300  363  413  594
West India merchants  120  156  196  242  559
Irish merchants, factors, dealers  114  191  201  272  551
Hop merchants  113  130  144  145  503
North American merchants  55  65  164  184  308
Silk men, mfrs. gauze weavers  137  185  226  247  297
Wine and brandy merchants  147  229  158  200  290
Corn factors  137  195  135  135  293
Dry salters  75  118  167  122  234
EI agents and merchants  19  93  13  68  226
Leather sellers, factors, tanners  177  254  259  190  224
Stationers  110  141  182  162  210
Timber merchants  81  85  148  160  200
Scotch factors and merchants  58  67  67  51  154
Totals (42 branches in all)  3,080  5,865  5,588  6,324  14,430
SOURCE: Bank of England.  C 36/16  TVF 3/25  “Account of the Principal Amounts Discounted in Bills and Note per month for the years
1825 and 1826.”
Table 3debt would be paid.  With this condescen-
ding argument, the letter concluded, 
“so  we hope the Bank will make no dif-
ﬁculty in giving up their privileges, in
respect of the number of Partners in
Banking as to any District [left blank]
Miles from the Metropolis.”49
Clearly, the Bank had failed to meet
the recent challenges adequately, and the
government was determined to create
competitive banks that might better serve
the public and, presumably, the govern-
ment.  The Bank’s response was under-
standably churlish, which Liverpool
informed them on January 25 he regret-
ted, but he was determined to move ahead,
merely asking if the government had any
amendments to propose to the bill pend-
ing in Parliament to permit joint-stock
banking.  He did then accede to encour-
aging them to set up their own branches 
as well.  Thus, the Bank went ahead with
establishing branches, gradually dispersing
seven of them into the industrial cities of
Manchester, Gloucester, Swansea, Birm-
ingham, Liverpool, Bristol, and Leeds,
starting in 1828, and adding Exeter, New-
castle, Hull, and Norwich in 1829, when
small note issues by the remaining country
banks ceased.  By the time of the Bank Char-
ter Committee in 1832, the branches at
Manchester and Birmingham were clearly
the most dominant in terms of note issues
and bills discounted.50
The Commercial Bill Market
Wilfred T. C. King, in his classic 
study of the London discount market,
identified the crisis of 1825 as bringing
about “changes in the banking structure
which were responsible for every major
inﬂuence upon market evolution in the
succeeding twenty years.”51 His analysis
of the crisis follows very much the lines
above, adding only the additional factor
that a series of good harvests had made 
the country banks in agricultural districts
especially ﬂush with funds.  In terms of
the conditions in the money market, how-
ever, the effects were limited in duration.
By June of 1826, the money market rate
had fallen well below 5 percent, and the
Bank of England was no longer besieged
with requests for re-discounting of bills.
Of more interest to King were the implica-
tions for the development of the bill market
in London from four changes in the ﬁnan-
cial structure that occurred in response to
the crisis.  These were: 1) the beginnings of
joint-stock banking, 2) the establishment of
49Bank of England, TVC3/11
G4/48, fo. 215.
50Bank Charter Committee
Report, Appendix No. 46, p.
47.
51King (1936), p. 35.
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Report of the Bank of England’s Committee on Branch Banking
Beneﬁts to the Bank of England:
1)  Increase circulation of Bank of England notes.
2)  Increase Bank’s control of whole paper circulation “and enable it to prevent a recurrence of such a convulsion as 
we have lately seen.”
3)  Provide large deposits.
4)  Protect the Bank against competition of “large Banking Companies” if the government should encourage them.
Beneﬁts to the General Public:
1)  Provide more secure provincial circulation.
2)  “Disasters arising from the sudden expansion and contraction of the currency would not so often occur.”
3)  Increase security and facility of transmission of money.
4)  Provide secure places of deposit “in every quarter of the Kingdom.”
SOURCE: Bank of England. TVC3/11  G4/48 “April 13, 1825, to 6th April, 1826, Minutes of the Court of Directors,” folio 194.
Table 4Bank of England branches, 3) the cessation
of re-discounting by the London private
banks, and 4) the assumption of some 
central banking functions by the Bank 
of England.52
The new joint-stock banks had to func-
tion outside London (thanks to the resis-
tance of the Bank of England) and they had
to compete with existing country banks by
attracting deposits rather than issuing notes.
King does not explain why this was so,
noting only that those joint-stock banks
that began business by issuing notes gave
them up after a few years.  It appears that
this development arose in large part because
the Bank of England branches refused to do
business with joint-stock banks that did
issue notes.53 Given that their business was
necessarily local and that they had no notes
to redeem, the new joint-stock banks kept
minimum reserves, relying upon re-discount-
ing bills of exchange to obtain cash when
needed to meet withdrawals of deposits.
They also had a strong preference for short-
term loans in the form of bills, rather than
government securities, as had been the case
earlier.54 As the country banks wound up
their small-note business, they also turned
increasingly toward deposits and the
behavior of joint-stock banks, as described
by King.  King concludes that it was the
period from roughly 1830 until the 1860s
or 1870s that the bill market became the
most important way in which domestic
credit was distributed within Great Britain.55
The second change identiﬁed by King,
the establishment of branches by the Bank
of England, also promoted the rise of the bill
market.  While initially the Bank’s branches
would seem to be serious competitors to the
local banks, they limited their lending activ-
ities strictly to commercial bills and then
only to very short-term and highest-quality
bills, as approved in London.  This limitation
effectively kept business intact for the exist-
ing local banks, save that their commissions
on discounting bills were reduced by the
knowledge among their customers that the
Bank of England branches did not charge
commissions.  But the facility of making
remittances to London and receiving credits
back from London through the Bank’s
branches helped local bankers use the
London bill market more cheaply.  A bill
drawn locally could now be sent directly
to a bill broker in London, who would be
instructed to pay the proceeds into the
Bank of England for the credit of the local
bank at the branch bank.  Moreover, a
trader in Leeds could pay or receive money
in Birmingham through the medium of the
Bank’s branches, for the “simple charge of
postage of a letter.”56 In short, the branches
of the Bank of England greatly improved
the payment mechanism that underlay the
smooth functioning of the bill market.
The third change noted by King was
the withdrawal of London private banks
from re-discounting after the 1825 crisis.
The run upon the Bank of England—as
well as its obvious reluctance to hold too
much reserves in gold, which was not
earning income for its stockholders—con-
vinced the London banks they should not
rely on the Bank of England exclusively for
cash in times of pressure.  Instead, they
turned to providing call loans to bill brokers,
who could, in turn, increasingly become bill
dealers.  Instead of delaying discounting of
bills in London until a matching buyer had
been found for the bills offered for sale,
larger ﬁrms could now purchase the bills
immediately, using funds on deposit with
them by the London private banks.57 Only
a few ﬁrms were as yet large enough to be
able to risk this next step, moving from bro-
kering to dealing in bills.  Even those like
Gurney’s probably would not have done it
then had not the market rate of discount
fallen below the usury limit of 5 percent.
Had it been at or above the usury limit,
there would have been no possibility of
making a proﬁt from strict dealing.
The ﬁnal step in completing the new
structure did not occur until 1830, when
the Bank of England opened its re-discount
facilities to the bill brokers.  Even this was
not sufﬁcient to overcome the informational
asymmetries that could still arise in the
market and that lay at the heart of later
crises when the emerging bill market was
abused opportunistically.  The remaining
problem was the Bank’s continued refusal
to discount at market rates, meaning that it
52King (1936), p. 38.
53Testimony by Henry Burgess,
the Secretary of the Association
of Country Banks to the Com-
mittee on Bank of England
Charter, 5324-26, in Great
Britain (1968), pp. 427-28.
54Pressnell (1956) later con-
ﬁrmed this tendency, even for
country banks, pp. 415-34.
55King (1936), p. 41.
56Testimony of William Beckett to
the Committee on Charter of
Bank of England, 1436-38, in
Great Britain (1968), p. 101.
57King (1936), p. 64.
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73was unaware of emerging imbalances in the
demand and supply of bills of exchange
until a large excess demand for cash showed
up at the Drawing Ofﬁce, as in December
1825.  Only when the practice of main-
taining ﬁxed discount rates at the Bank was
foresaken in the crisis of 1847 did the role
of the “Bank Rate” come to play its key reg-
ulating role in the British ﬁnancial system.
But the information ﬂows that had arisen
through the medium of the bill market
enabled the London banks to keep closer
tabs on the conditions of the country
banks, whether they were in agricultural 
or industrial districts, essentially through
the intermediation of the London discount
houses.  Further improvements in the man-
agement of information ﬂows within the
entire ﬁnancial structure were elicited in
response to later ﬁnancial crises, caused by
new, unanticipated shocks encountered as
the global economy of the nineteenth cen-
tury was created.
POLICY LESSONS?
The evidence of the bankruptcies cer-
tainly suggest that problems of adverse
selection in the London credit markets
arose in intensiﬁed form during the 1824-
25 bubble on the London stock market.
Combined with the evidence on changing
yield spreads for East India Company
stock compared with Bank of England
stock, and especially with the evidence of
the initial bundling and then wide disper-
sion of yields on the various Latin Ameri-
can government bonds, it lends support to
the hypothesis that the problem of informa-
tion aysmmetry, always present in ﬁnancial
markets, became especially severe in the
London markets in the years leading to the
crash of 1825. 
Asymmetric information is the term
applied to the usual situation in which
borrowers know more about the actual
investment projects they are carrying out
than do the lenders.  Lenders, knowing
this, charge a premium proportional to the
uncertainty they feel about the borrowers
in question.  This situation, in turn, creates
an adverse selection problem, in which
higher-quality borrowers are reluctant to
pay the high interest rates imposed by the
market, while lower-quality borrowers are
willing to accept the rates and to default if
their ventures fail.  In an expanding market,
which the London stock exchange certainly
was in the boom years of 1806 to 1807 and
again in the early 1820s, the availability of
loanable funds at premium rates will attract
lemons to the market (say, Mexican mines)
and discourage borrowing by sound enter-
prises (say, Brazilian diamonds).  Borrowers
turn back to internal sources of funds or to
a compressed circle of lenders who know
their superior quality and are willing to
extend credit at lower rates.
In the case of British ﬁrms in the 1820s,
the compressed circle of knowledgeable,
low-interest lenders was the web of coun-
try banks that had arisen in the past three
decades.  The continued credit access of
high-quality ﬁrms, however, depends in
each case upon the continued liquidity of
the small, local ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Their willingness to continue lending at
preferential rates is limited increasingly by
the risk of withdrawals by depositors who
wish to participate in the high-interest, high-
risk investments available in the national
ﬁnancial market.  A ﬁnancial boom of the
kind normally experienced before ﬁnancial
crises can discourage real investment, there-
fore, and intensify the lemons problem as
high-quality borrowers withdraw from the
loanable funds market.58 It can also place
increasing pressure on local ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries that specialize in monitoring
credit to local enterprises.  It cannot be
mere coincidence that the collapse of the
bubble of 1825, according to one account,
was set off by the refusal of a country bank
in Bristol to honor the request of a Mr. Jones
to redeem in gold its notes that he pre-
sented.59 The coup de grâce occurs when
higher-risk borrowers are asked to provide
collateral for additional loans, and the ﬁnan-
cial collapse decreases the value of their col-
lateral.  The outcome is a general wave of
bankruptcies.
Under public pressure, the Bubble Act
was repealed in June 1825.  In July 1826,
joint-stock banks were allowed to establish
58Mishkin (1991), pp. 70-75,
gives a detailed exposition of
the various routes by which
increases in asymmetric infor-
mation may exacerbate
adverse selection, monitoring,
and moral hazard problems,
especially if a banking panic
limits the ability of ﬁnancial
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74beyond a 65-mile radius of London with-
out limitation on the number of partners
(the previous limit had been six).  Both
actions were counterproductive, if we take
as given the traditional story that the entire
episode was yet another example of irra-
tional speculative bubbles derived from
crowd behavior in which investors  acted
first too optimistically and then too pessi-
mistically in response to fragments of
information.  On the basis of the informa-
tion-processing story told above, however,
we can conclude that both actions were
constructive.  Repeal of the Bubble Act
sped up the Parliamentary process of
granting corporate charters, limiting the
speculative period during which uncer-
tainty over the prospects of passage of the
proposed charter dominated price move-
ments in the initial share offerings.  More-
over, repeal did not mean that shareholders
were granted limited liability in the new
joint-stock enterprises; unlimited liability
remained in principle.  Supplementary leg-
islation in 1826 speciﬁed, moreover, that
Parliament could determine for each charter
the extent of liability of the shareholders.
With these changes, Parliament both
encouraged the continuation of the cor-
porate charter business, which must have
been proﬁtable to large number of the
members of Parliament, and discouraged
overpricing of the subscription shares while
the incorporation bill was in progress.
The collapse of country banks was one
of the last examples of a banking panic in
the British banking system.  As Mishkin
(1991) argues for U.S. banking panics, bank
failures removed from the capital markets
the principal monitors who could effec-
tively distinguish borrowers by their quality
without resorting to credit rationing  or arbi-
trarily high prices for credit.  Bank failures
worsened the informational problems in the
British capital markets.  Creating  joint-
stock banks within which the country
banks would become branches instead of
correspondents  helped restore this critical
monitoring function to the British system.
In the peculiarities of the 1826 Act, this
was done by linking the various country
banks within the structure of a joint-stock
bank headquartered in London.  But the
London headquarters performed no banking
function.  Its role was to process and dif-
fuse information to the various branch
ofﬁces located beyond the 65-mile radius
from London. 
The results of the ﬁnancial crisis of
1825 were beneﬁcial for the British govern-
ment.  The funded debt continued to decline,
after a small rise in 1827, throughout the
remainder of the century.  The government’s
gross income remained high and comforta-
bly above gross expenditures,  save for the
years 1827 and 1828, when it dropped
slightly below.60 The comfortable ﬁnancial
situation gave Britain the lowest interest rates
on its debt of any European government
throughout the nineteenth century—a great
advantage whenever it became necessary to
mobilize resources for armed conﬂict any-
where in the world.61 It also laid the basis
for continuing political reform, culminat-
ing in 1834, and economic reform, culminat-
ing with the repeal of the Corn Laws and
the Navigation Acts in the 1840s, and the
promotion of limited liability joint-stock
corporations in the 1850s and 1860s.62
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